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17 February 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2. South Vietnam: Khanh regime apparently considering new steps to gain allegiance of the rural population. (Page 4)

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4. USSR: Central committee plenum highlights intensification in farming as solution to agricultural problems. (Page 6)
5. Zanzibar: Security situation deteriorating as pro-Communists seek to block contacts with the West. (Page 7)

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South Vietnam: [The Khanh regime is apparently considering new steps to gain the allegiance of the rural population.]

[Khanh and other government officials have indicated that they contemplate reorganizations which will broaden the membership of both the Military Revolutionary Council and the civilian advisory Council of Notables. They apparently hope to increase rural participation in the Council of Notables by having some members elected by existing provincial councils.]

[Khanh's new interior minister has stated that he plans a vast training program for all echelons of rural administrative officials. He also indicated that many province and district chiefs, whom he characterized as still highly incompetent and corrupt, will have to be replaced.]

[In some of the most critical provinces, according to US military sources, new hamlet construction, as well as recruitment and training of civilian and para-military personnel, is at a virtual standstill and strong leadership and policy guidance are noticeably lacking.]

[There are new signs of potential friction in Saigon. The interior minister described Khanh as "too young, too inexperienced, and too military," and complained that Khanh's efforts to make all the decisions were leading to inefficiency and frustration in some ministries.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR: The central committee plenum which closed on 15 February concentrated on intensification in farming as the key to resolving Soviet agricultural problems.

Although no new policies were announced, the plenum established the framework for implementing the agricultural chemical program announced last December. Decisions were made to set up a national agrochemical service, farm seminars, and schools intended to help the farmers make maximum use of the new materials.

The plenum produced no new information on farm investment. Promises of increased farm machinery production mainly concerned the more complex and technically advanced machinery and equipment rather than large increases of standard items, such as tractors and combines.

Material welfare of the farmers was again acknowledged as a key to greater farm output, but aside from the adoption of a pension plan for collective farmers--an important step but somewhat peripheral to the question of wage incentives--nothing new was specified.

There were no indications of any plans to alter the present system of collectivized agriculture.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Zanzibar: Pro-Communists continue to block Zanzibar's contacts with the West, but they share the growing concern of other elements in the government over the security situation.

Although President Karume, an African nationalist oriented toward neutralism, reportedly is the most popular figure in the regime, he is too unsophisticated to deal effectively with pro-Communist Foreign Minister Babu and his associates. As a result, Babu has generally managed to undercut Karume's efforts to encourage the Western presence on the islands.

In the past few days, for example, Babu appears to have overruled Karume's promise to a West German representative that Zanzibar would not permit East Germany to send a representative to the islands. An East German chargé recently arrived on Zanzibar and apparently has presented his credentials to Babu. Soviet and Chinese Communist chargés are also present, and their propaganda has further isolated and confused Karume.

Internally, the security situation is deteriorating. There are at least six different armed forces on the island, most of them not responsive to government control. They range from the ineffective detachment of Tanganyika police, through "Field Marshal" Okello's thugs, to a force of "security police" recently established by a Zanzibari

This latter group, which is emphasizing discipline and ideology in its training, could become the most dangerous group of all.

Babu has asked Kenya to send a police detachment to help deal with the various armed groups. Although the Kenyans are reluctant to part with any security forces in view of their own internal problems, they are investigating the possibilities of a joint East African police mission.



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